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Abstract
The productive characteristics of migrating individuals, emigrant selection, affect
welfare. The empirical estimation of the degree of selection suffers from a lack of
complete and nationally representative data. This paper uses a new and better dataset
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emigrants to the United States for the period 2000-2004 together with positive selection
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1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to explain why the pattern of emigrant selection varies in rural and
urban Mexico. Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2007) shows that emigrants from Mexico to the
United States earn an average wage before migrating lower than the average wage of those
who decide to stay home. This is what Borjas (1999) defines as negative selection. However,
Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2007) also shows that positive selection exists in rural Mexico,
where rural Mexico is formed by those who live in localities with 2,500 inhabitants or less.1
The literature offers three main arguments that could explain these facts. This paper
examines the relative merits of these three competing arguments. It must be noted though
that they are neither exclusive nor exhaustive. Previous papers (see below) had already
shown the qualitative validity of the three arguments in different frameworks and with dis-
tinct datasets. The contribution of this paper is to assess both their qualitative and their
quantitative relevance in a common framework and with the same dataset.
The first of the three arguments is the Borjas (1987) argument, which disregards the
role of migration costs. If the return to skill were to be lower in rural Mexico than in the
United States whereas it were to be higher in urban Mexico, then we should expect positive
selection out of rural Mexico and negative selection out of urban Mexico.
The second explanation is the McKenzie and Rapoport (2007b) argument. They propose
that the existence of different selection patterns in different migrant datasets can be recon-
ciled by the existence of migration networks. Migration networks reduce migration costs so
that emigrants out of areas with larger migration networks tend to be more negatively se-
lected than emigrants out of areas with smaller migration networks. Thus, this could explain
the different selection patterns in rural and urban Mexico if migration networks were more
present in urban than in rural areas.
Finally, a third argument, developed also by McKenzie and Rapoport (2007a) among
others in a different setup, is related to the existence of wealth constraints affecting the
migration decision. Even in the presence of higher returns to migration for low skill individ-
1Whether positive or negative selection prevails in Mexico is not a settled question. Chiquiar and Hanson
(2005), Lacuesta (2006) and Mishra (2007) argue for intermediate to positive selection in Mexico as a whole
whereas Ibarrara´n and Lubotsky (2007) report negative selection. Cuecuecha (2005) and Caponi (2006)
obtain mixed results. McKenzie and Rapoport (2007a) and Orrenius and Zavodny (2005) find positive
selection in rural Mexico. See Hanson (2006) and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2007) for a complete review
of these results.
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uals relative to high skill individuals in rural Mexico which would lead to negative selection,
according to Borjas (1987) argument, it could happen that these low skill individuals cannot
cover migration costs by borrowing, thus resulting in positive selection of migrants.
Out of these three arguments, the first one is independent from the structure of migration
costs since Borjas (1987) considers them constant across skill groups. On the contrary, the
networks and wealth constraints arguments are fundamentally based in the structure of
migration costs. Most migration costs are difficult to observe (psychological costs of moving,
status costs of becoming an undocumented alien, family burden left behind...) and this
makes it difficult to understand how they can be related to observable characteristics of
migrants and thus how they affect migration selectivity. If migration costs are increasing
(decreasing) in productive skills, they will tend to accentuate (attenuate) negative selection.
With this, any migration policy that increases migration costs, such as tougher enforcement,
will lead to less (more or less2) negative selection. As a result, the true relationship between
migration costs and skill levels is not only relevant to study why migrant selectivity evolves
in one way or another but also to understand the consequences of different migration policies.
One reason why migration costs can be decreasing in skills is through the positive rela-
tionship between these skills and wealth (McKenzie and Rapoport (2007a)), which can then
be combined with the existence of wealth constraints in migration. This can be shown by
regressing, using semi-parametric analysis to account for non-linearities, the decision to mi-
grate on a household wealth index extracted from the ENET. The results indicate that the
probability of emigration is increasing in wealth for low wealth individuals and decreasing
in wealth for high wealth individuals in rural Mexico (individuals living in localities with
less than 2,500 inhabitants), consistent with the existence of wealth constraints and with the
findings in McKenzie and Rapoport (2007a) for the Mexican Migration Project3 database.
However, the result for urban Mexico is that there is no relationship between wealth and the
emigration probability. This could be used to explain why there is positive selection in rural
2Whether decreasing migration costs in productive characteristics will lead to more or less negative
selection depends on which side of the distribution of productive characteristics is relatively more affected by
the policy. Tougher enforcement unambiguously reduces migration flows at both extremes of the distribution
of productive characteristics but the effect on the average individual who migrates is theoretically uncertain
in this case.
3The Mexican Migration Project, developed by Princeton University and the University of Guadalajara,
surveys rural communities in Mexico. For more information, see http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/.
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Mexico whereas there is negative selection of emigrants from Mexican urban areas.
As for the ability of skill prices to account for the different selection patterns, simple
Mincer regressions are used first to show that the return to education in rural Mexico does
not seem to be low enough to generate positive selection of emigrants to the United States.
This finding is confirmed by the fact that observable skills account for a higher part of the
observed degree of selection in urban Mexico than in rural Mexico. In order to estimate wages
based on observable skills, the counterfactual wage density estimation procedure developed
by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) and applied by Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) is used.
Finally, network effects are shown to be more relevant in shaping migration decisions in
rural Mexico although networks, as defined by McKenzie and Rapoport (2007b), are more
present in urban Mexico. When networks are added as an additional observable variable
to the DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) counterfactual wage estimation, much more
of the observed degree of positive selection in rural Mexico can be accounted for. When
networks and wealth are jointly considered, all of observed degree of positive selection in
rural Mexico is accounted for whereas they have no impact on explaining negative selection
in urban Mexico.
The structure of the paper follows. First, the economic theory underlying this study is
sketched. Second, a description of the ENET dataset and several stylized facts is presented.
The following section explores how well different theories are able to explain the opposed
selection patterns in rural and urban Mexico. Finally, the main conclusions of the paper are
drawn.
2 Emigrant Selection Theory
This section reviews three simple variations to the classical selection framework derived by
Borjas (1987) from the combination of the Roy (1951) selection model and the Sjaastad
(1962) idea that migration is an investment decision in which individuals make the utility
maximizing choice out of a set of alternatives. These variations offer explanations to the fact
that emigrant selection patterns differ in rural and urban Mexico.
Following Borjas (1999), positive selection is defined as a situation in which4:
4Borjas (1999) definition actually also includes that the earnings of immigrants will be higher than those
of natives in the host country as long as the base average wage both groups have access to is the same.
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E (logw0|emigration) > E log (w0|no emigration)
where w0 represents the wage level in the original location (rural or urban Mexico in this
case).
Positive selection implies that emigrants are on average more productive (as reflected
on their wage) than non-migrants. The above inequality can be easily computed from the
ENET data for the Mexico-US case since both the wages of non-migrants and migrants right
before migration can be observed. In addition, the difference between the two expectations
can be interpreted as the degree of selection (DS):
DS ≡ E (logw0|emigration)− E (logw0|no emigration)
2.1 The differential returns to skill explanation
First, following Borjas (1987) and his simpler exposition in Borjas (1999), consider the
case where migration costs, in time equivalent units are constant across skill levels so that
emigrant selection is determined by the differences in returns to skills among competing
destinations. Suppose that individuals maximize utility on a period by period basis and
that their decisions for each period do not affect their outcome in subsequent periods5.
Utility consists of their log wage income net of time equivalent migration costs. Of course,
migration costs are not incurred if the individual decides to stay home. Otherwise, there are
three alternative destinations: rural Mexico (0R), urban Mexico (0U) and the United States
(1). The structure of wages in each of these places is given by:
logw0R = µ0R + δ0Rx
logw0U = µ0U + δ0Ux
logw1 = µ1 + δ1x
Individuals performance in the labor market depends on a vector of observable and un-
observable characteristics summarized in the variable x ≥ 0, whose density function over the
5Alternatively, think of a Mincerian world (Mincer (1958)) where wages are constant over time or, in a
more sophisticated yet still simple version, where the best prediction about future wages can be obtained
from current wages
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population is f (x). It can be assumed that base wages are ordered µ1 > µ0U > µ0R > 0
whereas no assumption will be made by now with respect to the returns to skill coefficients
δ1, δ0U and δ0R.
An income maximizing individual will migrate whenever the wage in the destination j
net of migration costs (Cij > 0) exceeds the wage at her original location i or other possible
destinations. This can be expressed with the following function:
I ij(x) ≡ log
(
wj
wi + Cij
)
' logwj − logwi − piij
where piij =
Cij
wi
are migration costs in time-equivalent units. As a result, emigrants from
rural Mexico to the US will be characterized by:
I0R1(x) > 0 and I0R1(x) > I0R0U(x)
and emigrants from urban Mexico to the US will satisfy:
I0U1(x) > 0 and I0U1(x) > I0U0R(x)
Suppose piij are considered constant across characteristics and also that piij = pi ∀i 6= j,
then the existence of positive selection in emigration from rural Mexico to the United States
would imply:
δ0R < δ1
whereas negative selection in emigration from urban Mexico to the United States would
require:
δ0U > δ1
Thus, the expression to be tested with the ENET dataset is:
δ0U > δ1 > δ0R (1)
2.2 The networks effect explanation
A second reason why different patterns of selection arise in rural and urban Mexico can be
found in the existence of migration networks. Munshi (2003) showed that the existence of
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Mexican migrant networks improve the economic opportunities of Mexican migrants in the
United States, thus increasing the return to emigration. On the other hand, Carrington, De-
tragiache, and Vishwanath (1996) or McKenzie and Rapoport (2007a) among others showed
that migrant networks also help reducing the costs of the migratory move. Both phenomena
can be modeled as a negative relationship between network size and migration costs: pi (n, x),
with ∂pi
∂n
< 0 and ∂pi
∂x
< 0 where n is the network size. Under these conditions and assuming
also that δ0U = δ0R = δ0 > δ1, McKenzie and Rapoport (2007b) prove two propositions:
Proposition 1 Larger migrant networks increase migration incentives (i) at all productive
characteristics (x) levels, and (ii) more so at low x levels.
Proposition 2 With intermediate self-selection, where the support of x is [0, x¯] and xL >
0, xU < x¯, where xL and xU represent the minimum and maximum level of productive
characteristics x at which people emigrate, (a) An increase in the migration network increases
the range of lower x levels that wants to migrate more than it increases the range of higher x
levels that wants to migrate. (b) Providing that f (x) is not increasing in x, larger migration
networks reduce average levels of x among migrants (and increase average levels of x among
non-migrants), therefore increasing the likelihood and/or degree of migrants’ negative self-
selection.
Again, the implications are testable with the ENET dataset. If the existence of different
migrant network structures in rural and urban Mexico were to explain their different selection
patterns, it should be the case that migrant networks are more present in urban than in
rural Mexico. In addition, caeteris paribus, higher levels of migration networks should be
correlated with higher degrees of negative selection.
2.3 The wealth constraints explanation
Finally, a third reason why selection patterns could be so different between urban and rural
Mexico is the possible existence of wealth constraints affecting the migration decision in rural
but not in urban Mexico.
In general, the structure of migration costs can give rise to many different migration
patterns characterized by positive, negative or intermediate selection. A priori, the relation-
ship between productive characteristics and migration costs can be argued to go in both
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directions (Ibarrara´n and Lubotsky (2007)). More productive individuals may decide to
migrate legally to be able to enjoy high returns to their characteristics in the destination
country (Hanson (2006)). Migrating legally usually requires longer waiting times with the
corresponding higher costs so that we would observe a positive relationship between migra-
tion costs and skill levels. In general, endogenizing migration costs will lead to this positive
relationship even for illegal migrants since they may decide to spend more on better illegal
crossing strategies (Gathmann (2004)) or even on their traveling.
On the other hand, since the relevant concept of costs refers to time-equivalent units, it
is obvious that the same level of real costs becomes more onerous for low wage individuals.
However, there is a more interesting case in which migration costs end up being decreasing
in productive characteristics: the case of wealth constraints. The reason why this is more
interesting is that the relevance of wealth constraints in the migration decision can actually
be tested, unlike other models of migration costs which are based on unobservable variables.
An individual is constrained in wealth when she would be willing to migrate given her
expected return to migration (I ij (x) > 0) but she cannot afford the trip. If credit markets
worked efficiently, this individual should be able to borrow in order to undertake migration.
Assuming that the credit market is not very developed or simply that collateral is required
in order to obtain a loan, Hanson (2006) suggests an easy way to incorporate a wealth
constraint to the migration decision:
γiCij ≤ Y
where γi represents the fraction of the loan that must be collateralized and Y denotes the
wealth level of the individual. It can be assumed that this wealth level is positively related
to the productive characteristics of the individual:
Y = ρ+ σx
where ρ > 0 stands for the part of wealth which is unrelated to productive characteristics
and σ > 0 reflects the positive relationship between productive characteristics and wealth.
Assume again that δ0U = δ0R = δ0 > δ1 and further that C0R1 = C0U1 = C. Given this
additional constraint, individuals will decide to migrate from i to j whenever the following
inequalities are satisfied at the same time:
8
I ij (x) > 0, I ij (x) ≥ I ih (x) ,∀i 6= j, h
x ≥ γiC − ρ
σ
≡ xCCi
Under these conditions, the degree of selection will only depend on the value of γi. In
fact, the degree of positive selection will be increasing in γi since higher levels of wealth
constraints imply that the minimum level of skills at which individuals start to emigrate is
higher. Thus, if differential levels of wealth constraints were to explain the different patterns
of emigrant selection between urban and rural Mexico, it should be the case that:
γ0R > γ0U (2)
so that the degree of positive selection is higher in rural than in urban Mexico. This is
another test that can be performed in the ENET.
The described situation is depicted in figure 1.
(Figure 1)
The following section reviews the ENET dataset and describes the different selection
patterns found in rural and urban Mexico.
3 The ENET Dataset
The Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Trimestral (ENET) is a nationally representative house-
hold survey that was carried out quarterly by the Mexican Instituto Nacional de Geograf´ıa y
Estad´ıstica (INEGI (2005)) between the second quarter of 2000 and the last quarter of 2004.
This labor force survey is similar to the American CPS and it has been used in a number of
different studies6.
The ENET has a panel structure that follows Mexican households for five consecutive
quarters. Every quarter, one fifth of the sample is renewed7. For the remaining four fifths,
6Robertson (2000) or Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2007) are two examples.
7Attrition rates in the sample are detailed in the appendix. The results are robust to the inclusion or
exclusion of quarters in which the attrition level is high. In addition, the observations that disappear from the
sample are not statistically different from the observations that remain in the sample in the main observable
characteristics.
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a person who is present in the quarter in which her household is observed but moves to
the United States (or elsewhere) in the following quarter is considered an emigrant8. The
characteristics of future emigrants can be compared directly to the characteristics of future
non-migrants at the same point in time.
Table 1 presents these characteristics for migrants and non-migrants first in Mexico as a
whole and then disaggregated for both rural and urban areas.
(Table 1)
For Mexico as a whole, the table reproduces the negative selection result reflected in
Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2007). Concentrating on the working age population, Mexican
male emigrants to the United States earned an average wage of 1.4 2006 US dollars per hour
the quarter before they emigrated, lower than the average wage of 2.1 dollars earned by
non-migrants. The same negative selection result is obtained for women. However, dividing
the overall population between urban and rural Mexico, where rural Mexico refers to people
living in localities with less than 2,500 inhabitants, it can be observed that the negative
selection result is not homogeneous throughout the country. Rural Mexico represents 22 per
cent of the overall Mexican population but rural Mexican emigrants to the United States
account for 45 per cent of male migrants and for one third of female migrants. Thus, rural
emigrants are over-represented in the total emigration flow.
The mechanisms that generate the self-selection of emigrants in rural and urban Mexico
must necessarily be different since positive selection characterizes migration flows out of
rural Mexico whereas negative selection is obtained if we only look at urban Mexico. Male
emigrants out of rural Mexico earn an average wage of 1.1 dollars per hour, higher than the
1 dollar per hour wage of those who do not emigrate out of rural areas. In contrast, male
emigrants out of urban Mexico earn 1.6 dollars per hour, much less than the 2.3 dollars per
hour usual wage obtained by those who remain behind.
In terms of other observable characteristics presented in table 1, emigrants are shown
to be younger than non-migrants both in rural and in urban Mexico (29 versus 35 years
old) whereas the education levels are in line with the selection result in terms of wages.
Whereas male emigrants out of urban Mexico tend to have 1.3 less years of education than
non-migrants, male emigrants out of rural Mexico present 0.7 more years of education than
non-migrants.
8See the data appendix for ENET total migration numbers.
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Working-age women behave differently from men in Mexico as a whole and do not present
relevant differences (except in levels) between rural and urban Mexico. Female emigrants
to the US are negatively selected in terms of wages both in rural and in urban Mexico but
they are positively selected in terms of education both in rural and urban Mexico. The
explanation might be found in the fact that many women are tied-movers, that is, they
accompany family members or travel to join them instead of moving for economic reasons
so that there is a small percentage of female emigrants that actually work and earn a wage
relative to men. This is the reason why what follows will focus on the behavior of male
emigrants.
3.1 Robustness of the selection result
There are several potential shortcomings in using the ENET to study emigrant selection.
First of all, by construction, whole households who migrate together are missed by the
survey. This introduces a bias towards finding negative selection. However, as Ferna´ndez-
Huertas Moraga (2007) explains, the education level of missing emigrants would need to be
3 years higher than that of those counted by the survey (0.4 is the observed difference in US
sources) and the undercount rate the highest estimated (25 per cent according to Ibarrara´n
and Lubotsky (2007)) in order to cut the negative selection result in terms of education for
males in half.
Secondly, the definition of emigrants as people who leave Mexico in the following quarter
to that in which their wage observation is recorded could be playing a role in the negative
selection result. It could be the case that emigrants accept lower wages just before they
decide to leave the country (Ashenfelter dip). If this were to be the case, it would be more
appropriate to use a different definition of emigrant, for example, those who leave the country
a year after they are surveyed for the first time. The structure of the ENET allows following
the evolution of the wages of a fifth of the sample for four quarters before they decide to
leave the country. This information is presented in figure 2.
(Figure 2)
Figure 2 shows the average wage level of future male Mexican emigrants to the United
States four, three, two and one quarters before they leave the country. There are no sta-
tistically significant differences between the wage levels of those who will leave in a quarter
and those who will leave in four. For completeness, the average wage level recorded for
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emigrants who just returned from the United States is also represented. This addresses a
third potential problem with the ENET dataset. The ENET records the selection of the flow
of emigrants whereas previous studies, notably Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), concentrated
on the stock of immigrants already present in the receiving country. Although looking at
the flow is more relevant in order to understand the mechanisms that determine selection,
looking at the stock becomes more important when studying the effects of immigration on
receiving countries (see Borjas (2003)). In this sense, the negative selection result found
for Mexican emigration should be corrected by the degree of selection of returning migrants
from the United States. However, figure 2 shows that the average wage returned migrants
earn is not significantly different from the average wage of emigrants suggesting there are
not relevant differences between the two groups. In fact, return male migrants in the ENET
turn out to be three years older on average than non-migrants and to have 0.4 less years of
schooling than emigrants to the United States. Although this last number is probably biased
downwards by the fact that the ENET misses returned migrants who do not come back to
established households (those who create new households), the magnitude of the difference
is again too small compared with the negative selection in schooling years for males reflected
in the ENET.
Finally, the ENET does not differentiate between emigrants who settle in the United
States for a while and those who go back and forth often (see Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga
(2007) for details). Thus if, as Hanson (2006) suggests, temporary or seasonal migrants were
to be on average less educated than permanent migrants, there would be another source of
bias in the ENET towards finding negative selection. It does not seem that this effect is
quantitatively relevant since temporary migrants are enumerated as returned migrants in the
quarters in which they come back to Mexico and figure 2 shows that there are no significant
differences between returned migrants and emigrants in terms of wages. In addition, if there
were substantial differences between seasonal migrants and more permanent ones, there
should be differences in the characteristics of emigrants depending on the quarter on which
their observation was taken. This is what is shown in figure 3 for male wages in urban and
rural Mexico.
(Figure 3)
Figure 3 confirms that the composition of the emigrant flow is not affected by seasonality
in terms of wages neither in rural nor in urban Mexico. Similar results are obtained for other
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characteristics, such as age or education. The existence of seasonality on migration flows,
noticed by Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) among others and present also in the ENET (see
appendix), does not significantly alter the negative selection result for urban Mexico and the
positive selection result for rural Mexico.
3.2 Effects of observables and unobservables
Since Mexican emigrants to the United States are younger than non-migrants, one could
think that the negative selection result in terms of wages results from a seniority effect.
Older individuals have more experience in the labor market and are thus able to obtain
higher wages. Although this is true, if we compute selection at different age levels, we still
find negative selection for Mexico as a whole. In general, it is interesting to understand which
part of the selection result is due to differing observable characteristics of emigrants and
which part of the result is due to unobservable characteristics. One way of performing this
calculation non-parametrically is to use DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) reweighing
procedure, following Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2007),
both for urban and rural Mexico.
First, figure 4 shows how the wage distribution of male emigrants and non-migrants
reflects the negative selection result for urban Mexico and the positive selection result for
rural Mexico. The wage distribution is calculated as the kernel density estimate9 of the
distribution of the logarithm of real hourly wages in 2006 dollars relative to their quarter
average (to avoid time trend effects) registered for the group of migrant and non-migrant
men aged 16 to 65 years old in the period going from the second quarter of 2000 to the third
quarter of 2004. The wage distribution is calculated both for rural and urban Mexico. In the
case of urban Mexico, it can be seen that the wage distribution of migrants lies to the left of
the wage distribution of non-migrants, evidencing the existence of negative selection. The
distance between the averages of both wage distributions, previously defined as the degree of
selection, is -0.28. For rural Mexico, both wage distribution are displaced to the left of the
9The estimated density is gˆ (w) = 1hN
∑N
i=1K
(
w−wi
h
)
where N is the number of observations. K (u) =
3
4 (1 − u2) for −1 < u < 1 and K (u) = 0 otherwise is the Epanechnikov kernel, where u = w−wih . The
optimal bandwidth (Silverman (1986)) is h = 0.9σˆN−
1
5 with σˆ = min{S, IQR1.349} where S is the sample
standard deviation and IQR is the inter-quartile range. To prevent over-smoothing and following Leibbrandt,
Levinsohn, and McCrary (2005), I use a bandwidth which is 0.75 times this optimal level.
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urban wage distributions but this time most migrant wages lie to the right of non-migrant
wages, suggesting the existence of positive selection out of rural Mexico. The computed
degree of positive selection is 0.17.
(Figure 4)
Figure 5 rewrites the result offered in figure 4 as the difference between the density of
migrant wages and the density of non-migrant wages, both for urban and rural Mexico. The
concentration of positive mass to the left of the median wage level (vertical solid line in
figure 5) reflects negative selection in the urban Mexico graph whereas the opposite is true
for rural Mexico.
(Figure 5)
As pointed out above, the representation of actual wage distributions in figures 4 and
5 could just be reflecting the existing differences, described in table 1, in the observable
characteristics of migrants and non-migrants out rural and urban Mexico. To understand
to what extent the selection result could be explained by observable characteristics, the
information on emigrant wages in the ENET is ignored and their wage distribution is inferred
only from their observable characteristics, whose market prices are obtained from regressing
the wages of non-migrants on the productive characteristics of non-migrants, as suggested
by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) and Chiquiar and Hanson (2005).
Following the exposition in Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2007), the actual wage distri-
bution of non-migrants (gNM,0 (w)) computed in figure 4 can be compared now not to the
actual wage distribution of emigrants (gM,0 (w)) but to a counterfactual wage distribution
(gˆM,0 (w)) built from their observable characteristics. The actual wage distributions can be
rewritten as:
gi,0 (w) =
∫
fi,0 (w|x)hi,0 (x) dx; i = NM,M
where fi,0 (w|x) represents how the wage responds to changes in observables characteris-
tics x and hi,0 (x) is the density of characteristics at location 0 for individuals in situation i.
Now, instead of directly observing gM,0 (w), assume that this has to be estimated from the
observable characteristics of emigrants. Formally, the required counterfactual is:
gˆM,0 (w) ≡
∫
fNM,0 (w|x)hM,0 (x) dx
that is, the estimated wage distribution of emigrants will be based on the way observable
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characteristics of non-migrants are rewarded: fNM,0 (w|x). In order to do this, DiNardo,
Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) suggest the following. First, rewrite the density as:
gˆM,0 (w) =
∫
fNM,0 (w|x)hM,0 (x) dx =
∫
fNM,0 (w|x)hNM,0 (x) hM,0 (x)
hNM,0 (x)
dx
This is equivalent to reweighting the non-migrant wage distribution by the factor θ ≡
hM,0(x)
hNM,0(x)
, which can be computed using Bayes’ theorem as:
θ =
hM,0 (x)
hNM,0 (x)
=
P (M |x)
1−P (M |x)
P (M)
1−P (M)
P (M |x) can be estimated from a logit model of the probability of emigration10 regressed
on observable characteristics whereas P (M) refers to the proportion of emigrants in the
sample. The result from estimating gˆM,0 (w) can be observed in figure 6.
(Figure 6)
Figure 6 shows the kernel density estimate of the non-migrant wage distribution (solid
line) already calculated in figures 4 and 5 together with the counterfactual density (dashed
line) corresponding to the wage emigrants should be earning according to their observable
characteristics. As a result, the difference between the two densities reflects the part of
selection that is due only to observable characteristics of the migrants. The rest of the
difference with the actual wage distribution of the emigrants can be considered as the effect
of unobservables in selection. To see more clearly the differences between the actual and
counterfactual wage distributions, figure 7 is constructed in the same way as figure 5.
(Figure 7)
The difference between the graphs in figure 7 and figure 5 can be summarized in terms of
averages. The degree of selection on observables can be computed as the difference between
the average of the counterfactual migrant wage distribution and the average of the actual
non-migrant wage distribution. This degree of selection on observables is -0.17 for urban
Mexico and 0.08 for rural Mexico. This means that the degree of selection on observables
coincides in sign with the actual degree of selection: positive for rural and negative for urban
Mexico. Observable characteristics account for 60 per cent of the observed negative selection
10The logit regresses the migration dummy from the ENET on the following variables (used in Chiquiar
and Hanson (2005)): schooling groups, age, age squared, marital status and interactions of these variables
with the schooling groups. The results of this auxiliary regression are available from the author upon request.
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in urban Mexico and for 48 per cent of the observed degree of positive selection in rural
Mexico.
There are a multiplicity of factors that could be related to the unobservable component
of the degree of selection. The negative selection on unobservables in urban Mexico could
in principle be related to the existence of an Ashenfelter dip that reduces wages right before
migration but figure 2 seems to suggest this is not the case. In addition, rural Mexico
presents the opposite result so this is an unlikely explanation. Another explanation could be
the existence of low unobserved ability in the case of urban Mexico emigrants (Borjas (1987))
together with high unobserved ability for emigrants out of rural Mexico (Chiswick (1978)
and Chiswick (1999) explain a variety of reasons why emigrants could be positively selected
in unobservables). Furthermore, access to networks is another unobservable component
in these calculations so that negative selection in urban Mexico could be hiding a worse
access to networks in this area as opposed to rural Mexico, where the positive selection in
unobservables could be hiding a better access to local networks. If this was the case and
local networks were correlated with migration networks, the result would go in the opposite
direction of the McKenzie and Rapoport (2007b) explanation by which positive selection in
rural Mexico could be partly due to the lack of access to migration networks in this area of
the country. Finally, the existence of wealth constraints affecting selection would be another
unobservable component that could explain why unobservables are more relevant in rural
than in urban Mexico, consistent with the existence of positive selection in rural Mexico and
negative selection in urban Mexico. The two latter explanations will be reviewed in the next
section of the paper, together with the classical Borjas (1987) argument.
4 Explaining differing selection patterns
This section explores which of the three theories summarized in section 2 could better accom-
modate the existence of positive selection in rural Mexico together with negative selection in
urban Mexico in the period 2000-2004: differential returns to skill, network effects or wealth
constraints.
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4.1 Differential returns to skill
The expression to test is the inequality (1) in section 2. If the returns to skill were higher in
urban Mexico than in the United States and, in addition, higher in the United States than
in rural Mexico, then that could explain why positive selection prevails in rural Mexico while
there is negative selection in urban Mexico and this would confirm Borjas (1987) classical
theory.
The main problem with such a test is to determine the concept of returns to skill that
would be relevant to the migration decision. Most of the literature identifies the theoret-
ical δ’s with the return to education11. Under this identification, running simple Mincer
regressions on rural and urban Mexico and on Mexican immigrants in the United States and
comparing the coefficients on the return to schooling can be done as an approximation to
the test. Table 2 presents the results from this exercise. The data for Mexican immigrants
in the United States come from the American Community Survey (ACS; see Ruggles, Sobek,
Alexander, Fitch, Goeken, Hall, King, and Ronnander (2004)) and, for comparability pur-
poses, it refers to recent Mexican immigrants in the United States, defining them as those
who arrived there a year before the survey takes place.12
(Table 2)
Concentrating on the coefficient of schooling years, table 2 shows that the market price of
an additional year of education is slightly higher in urban Mexico than in rural Mexico and
also higher in both cases (0.09) than in the United States (0.03). These estimates are in line
with the findings reported in Hanson (2006) and would imply negative selection of Mexican
emigrants to the United States both out of rural and of urban Mexico. The only contribution
to the previous literature is the calculation of the schooling coefficient both for urban and for
rural Mexico, which turns out to be of similar magnitude although significantly higher (at
a 95 per cent confidence level) in urban Mexico than in rural Mexico. These results would
suggest that the Borjas (1987) hypothesis, summarized by equation (1), can be rejected.
However, table 2 also presents the calculation of Mincer regressions only for the population
11Cragg and Epelbaum (1996), Hanson (2006) and Ibarrara´n and Lubotsky (2007) are just some examples.
12Summary statistics for the ACS are provided in the data appendix. Alternative definitions of Mexican
immigrants in the US do not alter the results. The ACS is preferred to other sources, like the Current
Population Survey in the United States, because it enumerates more immigrants than the latter. Still, the
ACS is likely to under-count Mexican immigrants in the US, especially if they are undocumented (see Hanson
(2006) and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2007) for details).
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of future working-age Mexican emigrants to the United States. Confining out attention to
this sample, which is the one that ultimately emigrates, it can be observed that the return
to an additional year of schooling is still higher in urban Mexico (0.06) than in rural Mexico
(0.04) and for both higher than in the United States (0.03). The returns to education are
in both cases significantly lower for emigrants than for the rest of the population. In the
case of rural Mexico, although the point estimate suggests otherwise, it is no longer possible
to reject the hypothesis that the return to an additional year of schooling is lower in rural
Mexico than in the United States so that equation (1) could still be true.
Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2003) question the appropriateness of using traditional
Mincer regressions to compute the return to education. Lacking the desired data, addressing
all of the concerns that they stress is out of the scope of this paper. Still, they argue that
one of the quantitatively more important biases in the calculation of rates of return arises
from the assumptions of linearity in education and from the separability between schooling
and work experience. Relaxing the assumption of linearity does not alter the conclusions
from table 2, as it can be observed in figure 8.
(Figure 8)
Figure 8 graphs the coefficients from regressing log wages on the same variables as in table
2, but this time substituting the schooling years variable for several schooling categories.
The first graph shows that the structure of schooling returns is similar in urban and in
rural Mexico and clearly above the returns to schooling for Mexican immigrants in the US.
The second repeats the exercise just for Mexican emigrants. Although the graphed point
estimates suggest that returns to schooling are higher for Mexican emigrants out of rural
Mexico at low schooling levels and higher for emigrants out of urban Mexico at high schooling
levels, the fact is that none of this results is statistically significant at a 95 per cent confidence
level.
It could be argued that education is not the only skill valued by the market. In this sense,
Borjas (2003) assumes competition in the labor market happens at narrow skill levels, where
skills are defined by education-experience cells. Also, Hanson (2006) shows how the Mexico-
US wage differential varies by education-experience cell. Unfortunately, data problems do
not allow the replication of this exercise. The standard errors of the ACS become too large
when the wage data are disaggregated by education-skill cells and the same can be said
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about the wage data for Mexican emigrants in rural areas in the ENET.13
The conclusion is thus that Borjas (1987) theory seems to perfectly fit the selection of
emigrants out of urban Mexico but it has more problems predicting the selection pattern out
of rural Mexico despite the fact that the validity of the theory cannot be clearly rejected.
This is not surprising, as shown in the previous section, taking into account that observable
characteristics were only able to explain 48 per cent of the actual degree of positive selection
of emigrants out of rural Mexico.
4.2 Network Effects
McKenzie and Rapoport (2007b) proved propositions 1 and 2, rewritten in section 2.2 of this
paper. These propositions suggest that larger migration networks should be correlated with
more negative selection of emigrants. The reason is that migration networks reduce costs
(or increase benefits) from migration relatively more for individuals at the low end of the
skill distribution. However, the fact that this assertion is true does not say anything about
its ability to disentangle the differences in selection between urban and rural Mexico. In
a sense, McKenzie and Rapoport (2007b) showed the qualitative validity of propositions 1
and 2 whereas what will be assessed in this section is its quantitative relevance in explaining
differing selection patterns.
McKenzie and Rapoport (2007b) perform their exercise in a different survey: the En-
cuesta Nacional de la Dina´mica Demogra´fica (ENADID) for 199714. Their results suggest
that the effect of migration networks on the probability of emigrating for the first time to
the US in the period 1996-1997 is 29 per cent lower in localities with more than 100,000
inhabitants but they do not compute directly the effect of the locality size on the degree of
selection.15 They measure their migration network variable as the proportion of individuals
13Results available from the author upon request.
14The ENADID is a nationally representative household survey that INEGI carried out in 1992 and 1997.
For more information on the ENADID, see McKenzie and Rapoport (2007a) and McKenzie and Rapoport
(2007b).
15Their coefficient on the effect of the interaction between education and the migration network on the
probability of emigrating becomes less negative (implying less negative selection) when they take localities
larger than 100,000 inhabitants out of the sample. Although this difference is not significant, this would go
against the fact that negative selection prevails in urban Mexico whereas positive selection prevails in rural
Mexico.
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aged 15 and over in a given community (municipality) who have ever migrated16. Unfor-
tunately, this information is not present in the ENET17. For comparability purposes, I use
their migration network variable calculated from the ENADID in what follows.
First, table 3 presents some preliminary evidence by reproducing the summary statistics
computed in table 1 but this time dividing the sample between municipalities with high
community migration prevalence (high migration network) and low community migration
prevalence (low migration network), with the cutoff value determined by the median at the
national level (24 per cent).
(Table 3)
At this level of disaggregation, table 3 says little about the role of migration networks in
shaping migrant selection. The dichotomous migration network variable seems to be related
to the level of wages and schooling years both in rural and in urban Mexico but there does not
seem to be any substantial difference between migrants and non-migrants in both groups.
The only exception is the part of rural Mexico with high network prevalence, where the
positive selection result in terms of schooling years remains but it is overturned in terms of
wages (the difference is not statistically significant though) as theory would predict. It is
somehow surprising that in high network areas emigrants tend to come from counties where
the presence of networks is lower than in those counties in which non-migrants concentrate.
Only in low network areas in rural Mexico it is possible to find the expected result that
emigrants live in areas with higher network levels than non-migrants. The emigration rate
to the United States is higher in low network areas than in high network areas in urban
Mexico but the opposite is true for rural Mexico. This suggests, as McKenzie and Rapoport
(2007b) point out, that the role of networks in the migration decision is more relevant in rural
than in urban Mexico. Even if higher network prevalence leads to more negative selection,
it does not seem likely that networks can explain the different selection patterns in urban
and rural Mexico, taking into account that networks do not seem to matter much in urban
16Their measure is imperfect since it counts both those who have ever migrated abroad and those who
have ever migrated internally. However, they show that this measure is highly correlated with other network
variables and instruments used in the literature, like the 1924 state migration rates, also used by Woodruff
and Zenteno (2007).
17In unreported results, I construct a municipal network variable from the ENET as the average municipal
emigration rate to the United States of individuals aged 16 and 65 in the 2000-2004 period. The correlation
coefficient between this variable and the ENADID network variable is 0.21. However, using this alternative
variable as a measure of network for what follows does not change the results.
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Mexico (where selection is negative) whereas they seem to be a more relevant factor in rural
Mexico (where selection is positive).
A final exercise that can be performed to assess the impact of networks on the computed
degree of selection is to redo the calculation in section 3.2. Figures 6 and 7 represented
counterfactual wage distributions for Mexican emigrants to the United States based just on
their observable characteristics. Those observable characteristics (schooling, age and mar-
ital status) were able to explain 60 per cent of the actual degree of negative selection for
urban Mexico (-0.28) and just 48 per cent of the actual degree of positive selection (0.17) for
urban Mexico. Stretching the spirit of the DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) reweighing
procedure, assume that the network prevalence variable constitutes another observable char-
acteristic that can be used when computing counterfactual wages. This should be considered
as a mere accounting exercise since migration networks should not in principle have any ef-
fect on wages at home. If such effects are present, they should be attributed to a correlation
between migration networks and networks at home or to some spurious correlation between
migration networks and economic conditions (suggested by table 3). With these caveats in
mind, the result from including migration networks in the computation of counterfactual
wage densities for emigrants in rural and urban Mexico18 can be observed in figures 9 and
10.
(Figure 9)
(Figure 10)
Figures 9 and 10 appear almost identical to figures 6 and 7. Only the last panel in figure
10, referred to rural Mexico, shows a significant difference with the second panel in figure 7.
Visually, it seems that adding the network variable increases the degree of positive selection
that observables can explain in rural Mexico. This is confirmed by looking at the averages.
The average degree of selection in figure 9 for urban Mexico is -0.18. This is 64 per cent of the
actual degree of negative selection. Thus, adding networks only increases the explanatory
power of observables by four percentage points for the case of urban Mexico, consistent with
the observation from table 3 that networks did not seem to play a large role in the migration
decisions out of urban Mexico. The result is different for rural Mexico, though. The degree
of selection stemming for figures 9 and 10 is 0.15. This means that observables are now able
18See section 3.2 for an explanation of the computation of the wage counterfactual. The weights are
calculated as in footnote 10 and adding the network variable and its interaction with the schooling categories.
Results from the auxiliary logit regression are available from the author upon request.
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to explain 86 per cent of the actual degree of positive selection in rural Mexico, 38 percentage
points more than when networks were not included. Again, this confirms what was already
deduced from table 3. Networks seem to play a very relevant role in rural Mexico but not
in urban Mexico.19
The conclusion from this section is that network variables seem unlikely to be able to
explain by themselves why there is positive selection in rural Mexico and negative selection
in urban Mexico. Propositions 1 and 2 would suggest that network effects on the degree of
selection should be more pronounced in urban than in rural Mexico but the ENET survey
does not seem to support this view. The next subsection explores a third possible explanation
to the differing selection patterns.
4.3 Wealth constraints
The fact that migration is generally a profitable investment does not mean that every person
who could obtain this profit will actually emigrate. It could be the case that low-income
individuals willing to emigrate cannot do so because they lack the financial resources to cover
the migration costs. If this is the case, they could borrow to start the trip but sometimes
they do not have the possibility of borrowing, possibly because the financial sector in the area
in which they live is not specially developed, possibly because they do not have access to a
network (family or friends) that can lend them the money. If this is the case, this individual
will be considered wealth constrained. Wealth constraints could be able to explain why
emigrant selection in positive in rural Mexico and negative in urban Mexico. The reason
is that even when low-skill individuals have relatively more incentives to migrate in both
areas, because of the Borjas (1987) argument, it could be the case that these individuals are
constrained in rural Mexico and not in urban Mexico. This is the issue that this section will
address.
The existence of wealth constraints, in addition to be able to sort out the rural-urban
emigrant selection difference, is key to understanding the consequences of migration policy
on the selection of emigrants. Borjas (1987) simplest model of negative selection, presented
19In principle, the network variable could be capturing any municipality-specific component affecting the
migration decision since it is the only variable that changes at a municipal level. However, McKenzie and
Rapoport (2007b) showed that the migration network variable effects did not disappear or change their
magnitude even if they added municipality dummies to their main regression.
22
in section 2, suggests that any increase in migration costs, such as tougher enforcement at
the border, will lead to an increase in negative selection. However, if migration costs are
decreasing in the productive characteristics of the emigrant-sending country population, this
does not need to be the case and the selection of emigrants could actually improve.
Observable migration costs seem too small to justify the fact that the real hourly wage
is between four and five times larger in the United States for Mexican immigrants than in
Mexico (ACS data for 2000-2004, see data appendix). This leads Hanson (2006) to consider
that the real puzzle is why more people do not migrate than they are doing now, which
is another way of saying that migration costs must be incorporated to any modeling of the
migration decision. It appears that the most important migration costs are not observable so
that it is difficult to estimate directly their relationship with the productive characteristics
of the population.
There is one particular theory of migration costs decreasing in observable characteristics
that can be tested with the ENET data: the relevance of wealth constraints in the migration
decision. The reasoning is that individuals whose expected utility is higher in the United
States decide to remain in Mexico not necessarily because they cannot afford their trip but
because they need to provide a buffer of savings for their family for the time it will take
them to start sending remittances, for the probability of not being successful in crossing the
border in the case of undocumented migrants, etc. For these individuals, the probability of
emigrating should be increasing in a measure of their wealth, independently from their wage
level.
Once a year, in the second quarter, the ENET surveys the characteristics of the building
where the household lives, which enables the construction of a household wealth index.
Filmer and Pritchett (2001) suggest that a principal components analysis can be used to
this end. If this index is a good proxy for wealth (McKenzie (2005)) and there exist wealth
constraints in migration, the decision to migrate should be positively related to the index,
controlling for other observables and wage income, for low wealth individuals and have no
relation to migration for high wealth individuals.
The construction of the index takes advantage from six questions about housing charac-
teristics in the ENET. These questions refer to the ownership of the building, whether it is
a house or an appartment, floor, wall and roof materials, number of rooms and bedrooms,
kitchen and bathroom facilities, utilities included (water, electricity, phone, sewerage...) and
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antiquity of the building. In total, there are thirty-six characteristics from which dummy
variables are constructed taking a value of 1 if it is present and 0 otherwise, except for the
number of rooms and bedrooms. Filmer and Pritchett (2001) show that such a set of dummy
variables can be used to construct an index through principal components analysis which
does a good job in approximating household wealth by comparing the distribution arising
from the index from that arising from traditional measures of wealth in expenditure and
income household surveys in Indian states. Filmer and Pritchett (2001) methodology has
been extensively used. In particular, for the case of Mexico, McKenzie (2005) shows that
such a household wealth index performs well in approximating measures of wealth taken from
the ENIGH (Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares), the official Mexican
income and expenditure household survey, in 1998.
McKenzie (2005) constructs one general wealth index out of thirty asset characteristics
present in the ENIGH. In addition, he shows that three other indices made out of subgroups
of characteristics also provide a good measure of wealth: a housing characteristics index, a
utilities index and a durables index. Unfortunately, the ENET does not provide information
on durables ownership but it has some other indicators not present in the ENIGH, such
as kitchen equipment. Given these considerations, two wealth indices are constructed from
the ENET data in table 3. On the one hand, one that replicates the utilities and housing
characteristics index from McKenzie (2005). On the other hand, one that uses all the avail-
able information in the ENET with its thirty-six components. The construction of both is
detailed in table 4.
(Table 4)
Table 4 shows that both indices are coherent in the sense that they produce a reasonable
ordering that can be a good approximation of wealth, as McKenzie (2005) shows. Both
of them are very similar although the McKenzie index does a better job at explaining the
overall variance in the first principal component: 31 per cent versus 16 per cent from the
overall ENET index. As a result, the McKenzie index will be used in the calculations below
although the results do not change if the overall ENET index is used instead.
The assumption to be tested is whether wealth has a positive effect on the decision
to migrate, controlling for other factors (especially productive characteristics reflected in
the wage), for low wealth individuals. In contrast, wealth should not be relevant in the
migration decision of wealthier individuals. Given that there is positive selection among
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the rural population and negative for the urban population, one should expect that wealth
constraints would be easier to identify and more relevant in a context of positive selection
like rural Mexico.
To this end, the binary variable migit taking the value 0 if the individual remains in
Mexico in the quarter following the one in which the observation takes place and 1 if the
individual emigrates to the United States in the following quarter is considered as the de-
pendent variable20. The regressors that should affect this variable are the log of the hourly
wage (logwit), which should have a negative effect on emigration, and all other observable
characteristics of the individual: schooling, age, community migration prevalence (from the
ENADID) and its interaction with education (following McKenzie and Rapoport (2007b)),
family characteristics, distance to the border and dummies for time and Mexican states
(Xit). The most interesting regressor, though, is the measure of household wealth taken
from applying McKenzie (2005) index to the ENET (assetit).
A traditional linear regression analysis of the effect of the asset index on the probability
of emigration could be inappropriate if, as expected, there are non-linearities in this rela-
tionship. For this reason, a semi-parametric approach following the local linear regression
method of Fan (1992) is preferred. The regression to be estimated is the following:
migit = G(assetit) + ΓXit + it
Fan (1992) shows how to apply the local linear regression method for one independent
variable. Thus, the effect of all the controls must be discounted in a first step by estimating
Γ. To this end, the high order differencing method of Yatchew (1998) can be used. First,
the data are ordered in ascending order according to assetit. With dj (j = 0...5) denoting
the optimal Yatchew (1998) differencing weights of fifth order21, the following ordinary least
squares regression can be estimated:
5∑
j=0
djmigi−j,t =
(
5∑
j=0
djXi−j,t
)′
Γ + εit
20Internal migrants and international migrants to other destinations are taken out of the sample although
their inclusion does not alter the results.
21The weights are 0.9064, -0.2600, -0.2167, -0.1774, -0.1420 and -0.1103. Yatchew (1998) shows that
differencing with these weights attains 91 per cent efficiency relative to the asymptotic efficiency bound.
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The idea is that the difference between contiguous observations of the asset variable is
small enough to disregard it so that Γˆ is estimated efficiently and Fan (1992) local linear
regression can be run on:
migit −XitΓˆ = G(assetit) + ηit
The summary statistics for the data that will be used in this estimation procedure are
presented in table 5. The estimation is restricted to men aged 16 to 65 years old in order to
be consistent with the previous section.
(Table 5)
There are two main differences between the summary statistics in table 1 and those in
table 5. First, table 5 refers only to observations recorded in the second quarter of every
year from 2000 to 2004 whereas table 1 refers to all available quarters. Second, table 5 only
provides summary statistics for the observations that are actually used in the regression
analysis, that is, those not presenting missing values on any of the variables. The main
difference here is the exclusion of those individuals not perceiving a wage. All the regressions
in this section have also been ran dropping the wage variable and, if anything, the results
that will be presented are strengthened.22
Table 5 confirms that working-age males are much more likely to emigrate from rural
Mexico (13.1 versus 4.8 emigrants per thousand in urban areas). Male individuals aged 16
to 65 in rural Mexico live in households that are much poorer than those in urban areas
as measured by the McKenzie (2005) index. They also earn notably lower wages, which is
consistent with an average education level that shows four less years of schooling than what
is prevailing in urban Mexico. From the other categories, the most relevant information is
that rural households tend to have more members than urban households (5.4 versus 4.8).
Finally, network prevalence is much higher on average in urban (36 per cent) than in rural
Mexico (20 per cent).
The results from estimating Fan (1992) local linear regression23 for urban and rural
Mexico can be observed in figures 11 and 12.
22Results available from the author upon request.
23The complete results from the first auxiliary regression estimating Γ are available from the author upon
request. It is run on 357,257 observations and the R2 from the regression is 0.0109. The variables included
are discussed in the text and shown in table 5. Quadratic terms in age and schooling years and an interaction
of the network prevalence variable with schooling years are added. The signs of the coefficients coincide for
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(Figure 11)
(Figure 12)
The two panels of figure 11 separately show the estimated functions for rural and urban
Mexico with their corresponding 90 per cent bootstrapped confidence intervals.24 Figure 12
combines the rural and urban estimation for a clearer comparison. Both urban and rural
Mexico seem to fit to an inverted u-shape relationship between the emigration probability and
wealth. However, this result is much more pronounced in the case of rural Mexico, consistent
with the findings of McKenzie and Rapoport (2007a). In the case of urban Mexico, only the
poorest part of the population could be subject to some sort of wealth constraint according
to this graph but it must be mentioned at this point that the extremes are precisely the
values of the asset index that Filmer and Pritchett (2001) advise to take more carefully,
since it tends to over-discriminate at low wealth levels and to under-discriminate at high
wealth levels. For the rest of the urban Mexico sample (more than 80 per cent, by looking
at the depicted wealth quintiles), there is absolutely no relationship between wealth and the
probability of emigrating to the United States in the following quarter so that there does
not seem to be any scope for the existence of wealth constraints affecting the emigrating
decision.
On the contrary, rural Mexico’s result is consistent with the existence of wealth con-
straints in the emigration decision. The probability of emigration is clearly increasing in
the household wealth level (after controlling for all other observed factors in the ENET,
including the wage, and the network variable from the ENADID) for the four lowest quin-
tiles of the wealth distribution (figure 12 with national wealth quintiles), which, by the way,
represent 98.7 per cent of the total rural population in the sample (contrast with the rural
wealth quintiles in figure 11). So the big drop in the function is only due to the effect of
a very tiny fraction of the rural population (1.3 per cent), which would be consistent with
them being landowners25 although the number of observations is too small and, as it was
mentioned earlier, the wealth index may present problems at the extremes. McKenzie and
the more relevant variables, notably that of the education and network interaction (negative), with those
reported in McKenzie and Rapoport (2007b). Following Deaton (1997), the Epanechnikov kernel is used. A
bandwidth of 0.2 times the asset index range is chosen.
24The interval comes from the 5th and 95th percentile of the distribution originated by repeating the
procedure 1000 times by randomly sampling with replacement half of the observations.
25McKenzie (2005) suggests that the household wealth index is also well correlated with land ownership.
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Rapoport (2007a) find similarly a u-shape relationship between wealth and the probability
of emigrating in the Mexican Migration Project (some areas of rural Mexico) and attribute
this decreasing zone to the presence of landowners, who can obtain rents from their lands in
Mexico that they cannot get in the United States so they have lower incentives to emigrate
than those reflected in the typical selection model in section 2.
It would be interesting to investigate further why there are these disparate relationships
between wealth and the emigration probability at the rural and urban level. A first hypothesis
that could be put forth is household size. If emigrating individuals do not leave until they
have accumulated enough wealth on which their family can live before they start sending
remittances or in case there is a failure in getting across the border, then higher household
size should be related to a greater incidence of wealth constraints. In fact, if the above
estimation procedure is further divided by household size, the results point in this direction.
The emigration probability of individuals belonging to households with a size above the
median in the lowest wealth quintile is increasing in wealth whereas there is no relationship
for individuals belonging to lower size households. The problem is that dividing the dataset
too much leads to a lack of power in the estimation and the standard errors become too big
to draw meaningful conclusions.26
A second hypothesis that could explain the rural/urban divide is the thickness of the
credit market in rural and urban areas. There is some evidence that the credit market could
be more developed in urban areas of Mexico than in rural ones. According to Focke (2004),
only 6 per cent of the population in rural areas had access to a bank account, in contrast
to a 15 per cent in urban areas. In this sense, the World Bank is currently (2004-2009)
undertaking a project to develop the rural financial sector in Mexico since 74 per cent of the
municipalities (hosting 22 per cent of the population) do not even have a bank branch in their
territory27. Although the World Bank does not provide this information, these percentages
are likely to refer to rural Mexico (22 per cent of the population in 2000-2004; see table
1). These numbers refer to the formal financial sector so that it would be possible for a
developed informal financial sector to fill in these gaps. However, Paxton (2006) studies
semi-formal financial institutions in rural Mexico and finds that they are highly inefficient.
She calculates that the Mexican rural financial sector is 50 per cent less efficient than the
26A more traditional analysis based on a probit model of the emigration decision, available from the author
upon request, did not confirm this hypothesis.
27Information available at the World Bank web page: www.worldbank.org. Web accessed on 10-20-2006.
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urban one and attributes this difference to institutional factors rather than different client
profiles.
Finally, a third hypothesis can be found by going back to the original meaning of the
constructed asset index. The index reflects household infrastructure whose value could be
notably higher in urban than in rural areas. In this sense, it would not be surprising that
homes with the same amenities are more valuable and thus correspond to wealthier house-
holds in urban Mexico relative to rural Mexico. This would explain why individuals with
the same asset index value could be constrained in rural areas but not in urban areas.
In addition to being significant, the relationship between wealth and the emigration
probability is of a considerable magnitude. Taking into account that the average emigration
rate out of rural Mexico is 1.31 per cent (table 5), figures 11 and 12 show that the effect of
wealth on the emigration probability could be substantive. However, the fact that wealth
is associated with the emigration probability in rural Mexico and not in urban Mexico does
not say anything as to the ability of wealth constraints to explain the different selection
patterns in both areas. In an additional stretch of DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996)
reweighing procedure, the McKenzie (2005) asset index can be included in the computation
of counterfactual wage densities already undertaken in sections 3.2 and 4.2 (adding networks
on the second case). This is an useful accounting exercise to see to what extent wealth
constraints could be relevant in shaping the degree of selection. Figures 13 and 14 show the
results.28
(Figure 13)
(Figure 14)
Figures 13 and 14 do not seem very different from figures 9 and 10. For the case of urban
Mexico, the counterfactual wage density is basically identical to the one obtained when
adding only the network variable. The percentage of the actual average degree of selection
that observables (adding assets and networks) can explain is 65 per cent, only one additional
percentage point to figures 9 and 10. Thus, 35 per cent of the observed degree of selection
in urban Mexico is still attributable to negative selection on unobservable characteristics.
28See section 3.2 for an explanation of the computation of the wage counterfactual. The weights are calcu-
lated as in footnote 10 and adding the network variable, the McKenzie (2005) asset index, their interaction
and the interactions of these two variables with the schooling categories. Results from the auxiliary logit
regression are available from the author upon request.
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Again, this situation is not surprising taking into account the above result that the asset
index had no effect on the probability of emigration out of urban Mexico.
In the case of rural Mexico, consistent with the previous finding that the emigration
probability increases on the wealth index for most of the rural population (suggestive of
wealth constraints), adding the wealth measure to the counterfactual wage estimation has a
more pronounced effect. As figures 13 and 14 show, now the counterfactual wage seems to
be able to replicate the result obtained from using the actual wages in figures 4 and 5. In
fact, looking at the averages of the counterfactual wage densities for rural Mexico in figure
13, the resulting degree of selection is 0.19, that is, 107 per cent of the actual degree of
positive selection. The conclusion is that, once wealth constraints and network effects are
taken into account, the positive selection result in rural Mexico can be completely accounted
for. In addition, this shows that although positive selection prevails in rural Mexico in terms
of observable characteristics, there is no significant selection on unobservables (the negative
selection result is not statistically significant). Once networks and wealth constraints are
considered, there is no need to keep trying to explain the positive selection result in rural
Mexico but the existence of a significant degree of negative selection in unobservables in
urban Mexico remains a matter for future research.
In any case, the value of these results depends critically on the quality of the chosen
asset measure. All the results are similar when different household infrastructure indices
are taken from the ENET, which provides some confidence about the robustness of the
estimation. However, it would have been desirable to find an appropriate instrumental
variable for the effect of wealth in the probability of migration so that causation in addition to
correlation could have been tested and to avoid omitted variable bias, especially in the case of
idiosyncratic network effects or the possibility of being a remittance recipient. Nevertheless,
the inclusion of controls and fixed effects for time and location suggests that the estimation
procedure can be solid enough and informative for the proposed question. A supplementary
dataset other than the ENET would be needed to deepen the analysis presented here.
5 Conclusion
Immigration affects welfare in receiving and sending countries both through the size and the
composition of migration flows, which is determined by how emigrants self-select. This paper
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explores three factors affecting selection, and thus the composition, of migration flows from
Mexico to the United States in the period 2000-2004: wealth constraints, network effects
and skill prices. There are two motivations for this. The first one is the need to explain
why there are two very different patterns of selection inside Mexico: negative selection in
urban Mexico (emigrants earn a lower wage and have less years of schooling than non-
migrants) versus positive selection in rural Mexico (emigrants earn a higher wage and have
more schooling years than non-migrants). The second motivation is that the effect of policy
on the composition of migration flows will depend on the mechanisms that generate emigrant
selection. For example, a more restrictive migration policy consisting of toughening border
controls will generate a more positively selected migration flow when selection is negative to
begin with but its effect is theoretically ambiguous when selection is positive to begin with.
Out of the three theories that could explain the differing selection patterns in rural and
urban Mexico, all of them matter but they matter differently in different areas. First, higher
skill prices in urban Mexico than in the United States account for most of the observable
degree of negative selection in urban Mexico, where there seems to be no role either for
network effects or for wealth constraints. However, higher skill prices in rural Mexico with
respect to the United States, although relevant, are not enough to generate negative selection
in rural Mexico as well. On the contrary, the low prevalence of network effects at the
county level in rural Mexico helps to explain why selection is not more negative there. Still,
positive selection survives the removal of skill prices and significant network effects. Wealth
constraints must be added to be fully able to explain the positive selection result.
To sum up, the combination of the three factors is enough to account for the mechanism
of selection observed in rural Mexico. What remains to be shown is why there is still negative
selection in urban Mexico once the effect of all these variables is discounted.
By addressing the effect of wealth constraints on the migration decision, this paper also
contributes to understanding the structure of migration costs. Semi-parametric techniques
are used to estimate a non-linear function of the probability of emigration on wealth. The
result is that there is no evidence of any effect of wealth constraints in urban Mexico but
there is evidence that wealth constraints could be playing a role in the migration decision of
individuals living in rural areas. This would lead to the conclusion that migration numbers
would increase and the degree of selection would be more negative if the wealth constraints
suffered by the rural population were reduced by better banking institutions or just by an
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improvement in their economic condition, ceteris paribus. In other words, negative selection
characterized emigration from Mexico to the United States from 2000 to 2004 but it would
have been even more negative if there were no wealth constraints in rural areas.
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A Data Appendix
Attrition rates in the ENET29 are displayed in table A1. The average attrition rate is 11
per cent after one quarter. However, this is mostly due to the increase in the attrition rate
happening in 2003, when the average is as high as 17 per cent. Still, as it is noted in the
text, the main characteristics of the missing observations do not differ from the non-missing
one in the first quarter in which they are all recorded.
(Table A1)
The ENET enumerates both individuals who will emigrate in the following quarter to the
United States and those who claim to have returned from the United States to a household
included in the sample. The total numbers by quarter can be observed in figure A1 with
their corresponding 95 per cent confidence intervals.
(Figure A1)
The implied average emigration rate is 0.25 per cent of the population per quarter whereas
the implied return migration is one third of this number. Both figures are surely an under-
estimation since, as discussed in the text, the ENET does not gather information about
29Percentages are computed using survey weights. The results are basically identical without using them.
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neither emigrants who leave nobody behind (migrating with their entire family) nor on re-
turn migrants who do not come back to an established household. If a US migrant returns
and creates a new household, then it is not recorded as a return migrant. An additional
problem in the dataset is the absence of migrants (their observations were deleted in the
available file) from the first quarter of 2004.
Table A2 shows summary statistics for the ACS from 2000 to 2004 (used in the text) and
its comparison with the values from the ACS itself for 2000 (which has only 244 observations)
and the more reliable 2000 US Census.
(Table A2)
It can be seen that the picture that the ACS offers for recent Mexican immigrants in
the US (arrived a year earlier) does not statistically differ from that offered by the 2000 US
Census.
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B Tables 
Table 1: 
Population aged 16 to 65
Non-Migrants Emigrants Non-Migrants Emigrants Non-Migrants Emigrants
Percent Male 47% 81% 47% 78% 47% 86%
(0.0004) (0.0056) (0.0005) (0.0081) (0.0010) (0.0074)
Males aged 16 to 65
Age Average 35.0 29.4 34.8 29.6 35.9 29.2
(0.0175) (0.1726) (0.0194) (0.2422) (0.0397) (0.2441)
Median 33 27 33 27 34 27
Schooling years Average 8.5 7.2 9.4 8.1 5.4 6.1
(0.0060) (0.0551) (0.0066) (0.0788) (0.0106) (0.0689)
Median 9 6 9 9 6 6
Labor force participation 87% 89% 85% 87% 92% 91%
(0.0004) (0.0051) (0.0005) (0.0076) (0.0007) (0.0065)
Wage Earners 68% 60% 68% 61% 70% 58%
(0.0006) (0.0078) (0.0007) (0.0109) (0.0013) (0.0112)
Unemployment rate 1.8% 3.9% 2.1% 5.3% 0.8% 2.2%
(0.0002) (0.0036) (0.0002) (0.0058) (0.0002) (0.0033)
Hourly wage in 2006 dollars
Average 2.05 1.40 2.34 1.64 1.03 1.08
(0.0039) (0.0332) (0.0048) (0.0538) (0.0041) (0.0282)
Median 1.43 1.14 1.62 1.28 0.80 0.95
Live in Rural Area 22% 45%
(0.0005) (0.0079)
Observations 4,252,646 12,649 3,764,680 9,150 487,966 3,499
Females aged 16 to 65
Age Average 35.3 28.2 35.2 29.0 35.3 26.5
(0.0161) (0.4083) (0.0180) (0.5381) (0.0361) (0.5575)
Median 34 24 34 25 33 23
Schooling years Average 7.9 8.5 8.7 9.1 5.0 7.1
(0.0057) (0.1412) (0.0063) (0.1890) (0.0099) (0.1787)
Median 9 9 9 9 6 6
Labor force participation 42% 39% 45% 41% 32% 33%
(0.0006) (0.0160) (0.0007) (0.0199) (0.0012) (0.0270)
Wage Earners 28% 24% 31% 26% 17% 20%
(0.0005) (0.0137) (0.0006) (0.0169) (0.0010) (0.0237)
Unemployment rate 1.0% 2.0% 1.2% 2.4% 0.3% 1.1%
(0.0001) (0.0037) (0.0002) (0.0048) (0.0001) (0.0057)
Hourly wage in 2006 dollars
Average 1.92 1.49 2.06 1.74 1.06 0.86
(0.0047) (0.1027) (0.0053) (0.1359) (0.0069) (0.0624)
Median 1.32 1.05 1.42 1.15 0.79 0.71
Live in Rural Area 22% 33%
(0.0005) (0.0154)
Rural MexicoMexico
Summary Statistics
Urban Mexico
 
Source: ENET (2005). Standard errors in smaller font and in parentheses computed using the svy linearized option in Stata with the 
survery weights. 2000 only includes the last three quarters and 2004 only the first three quarters. The construction of wages follows the 
lines of Chiquiar and Hanson (2005). The ENET asks Mexicans for their wage in the previous week to that in which the survey is 
performed or, if the individual did not work that particular week, for the usual wage. The figure is then brought to the monthly level. In 
order to prevent wages to refer to different time periods, the observations for individuals who reported usual rather than actual wage 
income are dropped. I follow Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) in dropping observations of individuals who worked more than 84 hours or 
less than 20 hours per week. Finally, the observations for people who worked in the United States (mostly border workers) are also 
dropped. Real wages are constructed with inflation data from the INPC series, Mexican CPI, in Banxico (www.banxico.org.mx), the 
Mexican central bank. These are quarterly averages based on June 2002 and brought to December 2005 with an index of 116.301. The 
exchange rate, from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF, corresponds to the 1 January 2006 and it is 10.7777 pesos per dollar. 
Following Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), hourly wages are computed by dividing the monthly wage income reported in the ENET by 4.5 
times the number of hours worked in the previous week. Individuals are considered to live in a rural area when their locality has less than 
2,500 inhabitants according to the 2000 Mexican Census. 
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Table 2: 
US
All Migrants All Migrants Migrants
Schooling Years 0.0929 0.0630 0.0853 0.0374 0.0320
(0.0003) (0.0079) (0.0009) (0.0122) (0.0065)
Experience 0.0324 0.0199 0.0031 -0.0173 0.0155
(0.0002) (0.0059) (0.0007) (0.0078) (0.0057)
Experience2 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Constant -0.6885 -0.4491 -0.8067 -0.2736 1.6075
(0.0035) (0.0873) (0.0109) (0.1252) (0.0782)
Observations 1,789,715 4,297 243,295 1,651 1,264
R2 0.27 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.05
Mincer Regressions: Mexican males aged 16 to 65 (2000-2004)
Urban Mexico Rural MexicoDependent variable: 
Log of the hourly wage
 
Source: ENET (2005) for urban and rural Mexico and ACS for Mexican immigrants in the United States arrived a year earlier. Standard 
errors in smaller font and in parentheses. Coefficients in bold if significant at a 95 per cent confidence level. Experience is computed as 
age – 16 – (schooling years – 9). 
 
Table 3: 
Individuals aged 16 to 65
Non-Migrants Emigrants Non-Migrants Emigrants Non-Migrants Emigrants Non-Migrants Emigrants
Percent Male 47% 77% 46% 81% 47% 84% 47% 87%
(0.0006) (0.0100) (0.0010) (0.0132) (0.0013) (0.0103) (0.0013) (0.0107)
Males
Age Average 34.8 29.5 34.8 29.7 36.3 29.5 35.7 29.0
(0.0225) (0.2928) (0.0379) (0.4305) (0.0558) (0.3306) (0.0557) (0.3567)
Median 33 27 33 28 35 27 34 26
Schooling years Average 9.6 8.3 8.6 7.6 5.5 6.3 5.3 5.9
(0.0075) (0.0962) (0.0132) (0.1358) (0.0151) (0.0877) (0.0147) (0.1048)
Median 9 9 9 8 6 6 6 6
Labor force participation 85% 86% 86% 89% 92% 90% 92% 92%
(0.0006) (0.0094) (0.0010) (0.0128) (0.0010) (0.0089) (0.0010) (0.0093)
Wage Earners 67% 60% 70% 65% 69% 53% 70% 62%
(0.0008) (0.0131) (0.0013) (0.0191) (0.0018) (0.0150) (0.0018) (0.0163)
Unemployment rate 2.2% 5.3% 1.8% 5.3% 0.8% 2.5% 0.7% 2.0%
(0.0003) (0.0071) (0.0004) (0.0100) (0.0004) (0.0049) (0.0003) (0.0046)
Hourly wage in 2006 dollars
Average 2.48 1.72 1.93 1.47 1.12 1.09 0.97 1.07
(0.0059) (0.0701) (0.0068) (0.0771) (0.0055) (0.0339) (0.0058) (0.0430)
Median 1.71 1.33 1.36 1.16 0.90 0.99 0.73 0.91
Network prevalence 44% 41% 17% 17% 37% 35% 12% 17%
(0.0002) (0.0038) (0.0002) (0.0020) (0.0004) (0.0024) (0.0002) (0.0018)
Observations 2,725,285 6,484 1,039,395 2,666 273,502 2,178 214,464 1,321
Low Network Prevalence
Rural Mexico
Summary Statistics (2000-2004)
High Network Prevalence
Urban Mexico
Low Network Prevalence High Network Prevalence
 
Source: ENET (2005). See table 1 for details. The network prevalence variable is built as the percentage of individuals older than 15 that 
have ever migrated in a municipality according to the ENADID 1997. 
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Table 4: 
Characteristics McKenzie (2005) All ENET Mean Standard Deviation Lowest Middle Upper Lowest Middle Upper
Home owner -0.05 -0.02 0.70 0.46 0.76 0.64 0.68 0.73 0.69 0.66
Number of rooms 0.30 0.29 3.87 1.71 2.71 3.58 5.32 2.54 3.74 5.32
Bathroom 0.23 0.24 0.88 0.33 0.69 0.94 0.98 0.65 0.99 0.98
Adobe walls -0.21 -0.15 0.08 0.28 0.24 0.02 0.00 0.22 0.03 0.00
Brick walls 0.33 0.27 0.83 0.38 0.51 0.97 0.98 0.52 0.96 0.98
Cardboard or asbestos roof -0.32 0.24 0.42 0.66 0.05 0.00 0.60 0.10 0.00
Brick roof 0.36 0.30 0.69 0.46 0.18 0.89 0.97 0.23 0.84 0.97
Dirt floor -0.29 -0.23 0.10 0.29 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.01 0.00
Wood floor 0.30 0.27 0.38 0.48 0.03 0.25 0.83 0.03 0.23 0.85
Electricity 0.17 0.13 0.98 0.15 0.93 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.00 1.00
Water 0.24 0.19 0.91 0.29 0.75 0.97 1.00 0.75 0.97 1.00
Sewerage 0.30 0.25 0.83 0.38 0.55 0.93 1.00 0.55 0.93 1.00
Phone 0.30 0.26 0.38 0.49 0.05 0.22 0.87 0.05 0.27 0.82
Other utilities 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.36 0.03 0.04 0.38 0.03 0.06 0.37
Loft 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Communal appartment -0.08 0.06 0.24 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.13 0.04 0.01
Appartment Building 0.11 0.11 0.32 0.02 0.13 0.19 0.02 0.10 0.22
House -0.04 0.83 0.38 0.89 0.80 0.78 0.85 0.86 0.75
Lent house -0.05 0.09 0.29 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.04
Rented house 0.03 0.12 0.33 0.08 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.13
Not full ownership 0.06 0.09 0.28 0.04 0.08 0.14 0.04 0.07 0.15
Kitchen 0.17 0.84 0.37 0.71 0.84 0.97 0.66 0.87 0.98
Number of bedrooms 0.26 1.99 1.15 1.34 1.89 2.70 1.21 1.97 2.74
No bathroom -0.22 0.08 0.27 0.23 0.01 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00
Collective bathroom -0.09 0.04 0.21 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.00
Cardboard walls -0.05 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Metal or asbestos walls -0.05 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Wooden walls -0.20 0.07 0.26 0.21 0.01 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00
Cardboard roof -0.14 0.04 0.19 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00
Asbestos roof -0.21 0.20 0.40 0.55 0.04 0.00 0.49 0.10 0.00
Wooden roof -0.11 0.07 0.25 0.14 0.06 0.01 0.15 0.05 0.01
Cement floor -0.13 0.53 0.50 0.69 0.75 0.15 0.69 0.77 0.13
House older than 20 years 0.05 0.32 0.47 0.29 0.28 0.37 0.28 0.29 0.38
House 10 to 20 years 0.04 0.33 0.47 0.29 0.34 0.36 0.28 0.34 0.38
House 5 to 10 years -0.04 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.23 0.22 0.15
House 1 to 5 years -0.07 0.11 0.31 0.16 0.12 0.06 0.17 0.12 0.05
House less than 1 year -0.02 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
McKenzie (2005) Asset Index 0 2.09 -2.51 0.50 2.01 -2.45 0.46 1.99
All ENET Asset Index 0 2.37 -2.74 0.41 2.33 -2.81 0.45 2.36
Observations: 2,760,359 2,760,359
Eigenvalue for first component 4.3873 5.6388
Share of variance 0.3134 0.1566
Asset Index Construction (ENET 2000-2004)
Scoring factors
Means by tercile of asset indicator
McKenzie (2005) All ENET
 
Source: ENET (2005). Observations from the second quarter for the period 2000-2004. Principal components analysis and construction of 
a household wealth index. 
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Table 5: 
Mexican Men aged 16 to 65 years old
Mean or Proportion Standard Deviation Mean or Proportion Standard Deviation Mean or Proportion Standard Deviation
Emigrant the following quarter 0.0065 0.0003 0.0131 0.0008 0.0048 0.0002
Household Asset Index (McKenzie, 2005) 0.1384 0.0063 -1.9981 0.0142 0.6757 0.0055
Log hourly wage 0.3518 0.0029 -0.4219 0.0078 0.5464 0.0027
Schooling years 8.3667 0.0145 5.0643 0.0263 9.1972 0.0155
Age 36.1455 0.0376 37.7854 0.0925 35.7331 0.0408
Network prevalence (ENADID 1997) 0.3313 0.0006 0.2039 0.0009 0.3634 0.0006
Metropolitan Area 0.3685 0.0015 0.0170 0.0007 0.4569 0.0017
Rural Area 0.2009 0.0013 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Distance to the border (km.) 661.5893 0.7580 748.0348 1.6465 639.8514 0.8416
Married 0.7250 0.0014 0.7659 0.0030 0.7147 0.0015
Household Size 4.9706 0.0067 5.4614 0.0175 4.8472 0.0071
Household head 0.6830 0.0014 0.7172 0.0032 0.6744 0.0016
Spouse 0.0114 0.0003 0.0105 0.0007 0.0116 0.0004
Offspring 0.2402 0.0013 0.2258 0.0029 0.2439 0.0015
Other household members 0.0654 0.0007 0.0465 0.0014 0.0701 0.0009
Quarters:
2-2000 0.2357 0.0013 0.2856 0.0031 0.2232 0.0014
2-2001 0.1975 0.0012 0.1935 0.0028 0.1986 0.0013
2-2002 0.2232 0.0013 0.2326 0.0030 0.2208 0.0014
2-2003 0.1837 0.0012 0.1797 0.0028 0.1847 0.0014
2-2004 0.1598 0.0012 0.1085 0.0020 0.1727 0.0014
States:
Aguascalientes 0.0092 0.0001 0.0081 0.0002 0.0095 0.0001
Baja California 0.0334 0.0004 0.0141 0.0005 0.0383 0.0004
Baja California Sur 0.0057 0.0001 0.0055 0.0002 0.0057 0.0001
Campeche 0.0085 0.0001 0.0103 0.0003 0.0080 0.0001
Coahuila 0.0268 0.0003 0.0097 0.0004 0.0311 0.0004
Colima 0.0060 0.0001 0.0041 0.0001 0.0065 0.0001
Chiapas 0.0352 0.0006 0.0806 0.0023 0.0237 0.0005
Chihuahua 0.0337 0.0005 0.0194 0.0007 0.0374 0.0006
Distrito Federal 0.0944 0.0011 0.0010 0.0001 0.1179 0.0013
Durango 0.0149 0.0002 0.0208 0.0006 0.0135 0.0002
Guanajuato 0.0472 0.0006 0.0626 0.0019 0.0433 0.0005
Guerrero 0.0285 0.0004 0.0540 0.0014 0.0221 0.0004
Hidalgo 0.0201 0.0005 0.0434 0.0011 0.0143 0.0005
Jalisco 0.0548 0.0007 0.0311 0.0014 0.0608 0.0008
México 0.1464 0.0014 0.0797 0.0022 0.1632 0.0016
Michoacán 0.0342 0.0007 0.0536 0.0017 0.0293 0.0007
Morelos 0.0146 0.0002 0.0098 0.0004 0.0158 0.0003
Nayarit 0.0085 0.0001 0.0137 0.0004 0.0071 0.0001
Nuevo León 0.0494 0.0005 0.0107 0.0004 0.0592 0.0006
Oaxaca 0.0290 0.0005 0.0692 0.0019 0.0189 0.0004
Puebla 0.0472 0.0006 0.0527 0.0018 0.0459 0.0006
Querétaro 0.0143 0.0002 0.0208 0.0006 0.0126 0.0002
Quintana Roo 0.0122 0.0002 0.0090 0.0003 0.0131 0.0002
San Luis Potosí 0.0213 0.0003 0.0341 0.0010 0.0181 0.0003
Sinaloa 0.0257 0.0004 0.0313 0.0010 0.0243 0.0004
Sonora 0.0229 0.0004 0.0160 0.0006 0.0246 0.0004
Tabasco 0.0237 0.0003 0.0525 0.0011 0.0165 0.0003
Tamaulipas 0.0271 0.0003 0.0166 0.0007 0.0297 0.0004
Tlaxcala 0.0102 0.0001 0.0107 0.0003 0.0100 0.0002
Veracruz 0.0660 0.0010 0.1252 0.0031 0.0511 0.0010
Yucatán 0.0197 0.0002 0.0162 0.0005 0.0206 0.0003
Zacatecas 0.0090 0.0002 0.0134 0.0005 0.0079 0.0002
Observations
Summary Statistics
355,469 37,047 318,422
All Mexico Rural Mexico Urban Mexico
 
Source: ENET (2005) and ENADID 1997 for the network variable. Distance to the border calculated with data from the Center for 
International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University, 2000. US-Mexico DDViewer, 3.1. Palisades, NY: 
CIESIN, Columbia University. Available at: http://plue.sedac.ciesin.org/plue/ddviewer/ddv30-USMEX/. 
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C Figures  
 
Figure 1: 
 
 
Figure 2: 
US ENET Male Emigrants and Return Migrants (2000-2004)
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Source: ENET (2005). Construction of wages follows the procedure explained in Table 1. 
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Figure 3: 
ENET Male Mexican Emigrants to the US (2000-2004): Quarterly evolution of hourly wages
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Source: ENET (2005). Construction of wages follows the procedure explained in Table 1. Quarters refer to the quarter in which the wage 
observation was recorded. 
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Figure 4: 
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Source: ENET (2005). Log of the hourly wage relative to the quarter average. See table 1 for the construction of wages. For the 
estimation of the kernel densities, I use an Epanechnikov kernel (Silverman (1986)). To prevent over-smoothing, I follow Leibbrandt, 
Levinsohn, and McCrary (2005) in using a bandwidth which is .75 times the optimal. I follow Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) in dropping 
the highest and lowest 0.5 percent of observations to eliminate outliers. 
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Figure 5: 
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Source: ENET (2005). Migrant minus non-migrant wage densities computed in figure 4. See figure 4 for an explanation. The solid black 
vertical line represents the median of the log of the relative wage distribution. 
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Figure 6: 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
D
en
si
ty
 E
st
im
at
e
-4 -2 0 2
Log hourly wage in January 2006 dollars relative to the quarter average
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Men in urban Mexico: non-migrants and counterfactual for migrants
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Source: ENET (2005). The counterfactual (emigrant wages based only on their observable characteristics) is estimated following 
DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996). 
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Figure 7: 
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Source: ENET (2005). Counterfactual migrant wage density minus actual non-migrant wage density computed in figure 6. See figure 6 
for an explanation. The solid black vertical line represents the median of the log of the relative wage distribution. 
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Figure 8: 
Return to Schooling Categories for Working-age Mexican males (2000-2004)
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Return to Schooling Categories for Working-age Mexican males (2000-2004)
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Source: ENET (2005) for urban and rural Mexico and ACS for Mexican immigrants to the US. The figure represents the coefficients 
from the same regressions as in table 2 but this time substituting the schooling years variable for schooling category dummies, where 0 
years of schooling is the excluded category. 
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Figure 9: 
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(including networks)
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Source: ENET (2005). See figure 6 for an explanation. The calculation of the counterfactual includes the network variable and its 
interaction with schooling groups. 
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Figure 10: 
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Source: ENET (2005). Counterfactual migrant wage density minus actual non-migrant wage density computed in figure 9. See figure 9 
for an explanation. The solid black vertical line represents the median of the log of the relative wage distribution. 
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Figure 11: 
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Source: Fan (1992) local linear regression of the emigration rate net of other controls (see table 5 and text) on the McKenzie (2005) version of the asset index 
(see table 4). The dotted lines represent the 90 per cent confidence interval obtained from bootstrapping the procedure 1000 times by randomly sampling 
with replacement half of the observations. The vertical solid lines represent the position of wealth quintiles in urban and rural Mexico. Following Deaton 
(1997), the Epanechnikov kernel is used. A bandwidth of 0.2 times the asset index range is chosen. Although it is used for the calculations, the representation 
drops 2.5 per cent of the highest and lowest asset values. 
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Figure 12: 
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Source: See figure 11. No asset values are dropped in this representation. The solid vertical lines represent the situation of the wealth 
quintiles for Mexico as a whole. 
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Figure 13: 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
D
en
si
ty
 E
st
im
at
e
-4 -2 0 2
Log hourly wage in January 2006 dollars relative to the quarter average
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Men in urban Mexico:
non-migrants and counterfactual for migrants
(including networks and assets)
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Source: ENET (2005). See figure 6 for an explanation. The calculation of the counterfactual includes the network variable, the McKenzie 
(2005) asset index, their interaction and their interactions with schooling groups. 
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Figure 14: 
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Source: ENET (2005). Counterfactual migrant wage density minus actual non-migrant wage density computed in figure 13. See figure 13 
for an explanation. The solid black vertical line represents the median of the log of the relative wage distribution. 
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E Appendix Tables 
 
Table A1: 
Year Quarter After one quarter After two quarters After three quarters After four quarters
2 12% 18% 26% 27%
3 10% 18% 20% 27%
4 11% 14% 16% 19%
1 7% 12% 16% 19%
2 7% 12% 16% 19%
3 8% 12% 18% 20%
4 8% 13% 23% 29%
1 9% 20% 25% 21%
2 15% 19% 18% 32%
3 7% 10% 24% 32%
4 6% 21% 31% 33%
1 19% 29% 32% 39%
2 23% 26% 30% 29%
3 14% 19% 17% 30%
4 12% 13% 27% 17%
1 7% 24% 15%
2 21% 13%
3 9%
Average 11% 17% 22% 26%
2003
2004
Attrition (non matched individuals from quarter to quarter)
2000
2001
2002
 
Source: ENET (2005) 
 
Table A2: 
Individuals aged 16 to 65 US Census 2000 ACS 2000 ACS 2000-2004
Arrived a year earlier Arrived a year earlier Arrived a year earlier
Percent Male 62% 66% 64%
(0.00) (0.03) (0.01)
Men
Age
Average 26.6 27.2 28.0
(0.09) (0.89) (0.30)
Median 24 24 25
Schooling years
Average 8.6 8.9 8.9
(0.04) (0.33) (0.12)
Median 9 9 9
Hourly wage in 2006 dollars
Average 10.16 8.10 9.75
(0.12) (0.44) (0.28)
Median 7.94 7.14 7.75
Observations 21,930 244 2,658
Summary Statistics (US sources on recent Mexican immigrants)
 
Source: Ruggles et al. (2004) 
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F Appendix Figures 
 
Figure A1: 
Migration from Mexico to the US in the ENET
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Source: ENET (2005) 
